WHY PRESIDENT OBAMA SHOULD IGNORE THE FAR RIGHT WHEN IT COMES TO RUSSIA

The American Right Wing hates President Obama. They hate him so much they are outspoken in their admiration for the "manly" actions of Russian President Putin as he continues to threaten the former Soviet state of Ukraine.

There's one big problem with the Far Right going out of their way to criticize President Obama, while praising Russian President Putin: They remained almost completely silent when President Putin went into the former Soviet state of Georgia in 2008, when President George W. Bush was in the White House.

There's another problem with the Far Rights constant criticisms of President Obama's foreign policy decisions. Apart from providing President Putin with political encouragement for what he's doing the Far Right is demonstrating, once again, that they are historical illiterates and geo-strategic neanderthals.

Seriously, these people are clueless. Let's take a look.

Crimea in beige color, right below Ukraine

As was the case with Syria (which I wrote about here) Russia has some very legitimate economic, strategic, and military issues in Ukraine. This is especially the case in Crimea.

It's not well known in the West, or from the media's narrative, but Far Right groups in Ukraine aren't happy with ethnic Russians (or the Jews). Worse, they are preparing to confront the issue as the Ukraine state continues to unravel. With many ethnic Russians residing in eastern Ukraine and in Crimea (beige color, below Ukraine on the map) Russia can legitimately argue that it must act to protect ethnic Russians in the region.

There's more.

ECONOMIC: There's a U.S.-backed plan to endorse Ukraine's entrance into the European Union. If this happens, and as an economically weak nation, Ukraine could be subject to the same "structural adjustment" terms that were imposed upon Cyprus (as I wrote about here). Once they are strapped with excessive Western loans - and with it's floundering oligarch-ruled economy - Ukraine could be forced into bank supporting "bail-ins" (among other terms) they don't have to worry about now.  

STRATEGIC: Since the time of Peter the Great (1682-1725) Russia has sought access to warm water ports, a route to Mediterranean and the open seas. The stories of Peter the Greats moves to protect Russia's access to the Sea of Azov - and his moves to create St. Petersburg while guarding Taganrog - are legendary. Keeping Crimea within Russia's larger geo-political orbit only makes sense, especially if you're President Putin.

MILITARY: Russia already feels threatened by NATOs expansion into Turkey and the West's opposition to the "Shi-ite Pipeline" which Russia supports. By maintaining alliances and troops in "Russian" break off states - which Crimea could become - Russia maintains their military preparedness and national security interests (there are currently four break off states, including Transnistria, a "state" a former student from Moldova helped me develop a strong interest). 

Polls from the Kremlin show that the majority of Russians were initially opposed to Russia invading Ukraine. Still, President Putin has a pro-Russian leader - Sergei Akysonov - who has taken charge in Crimea and, like Putin, could benefit from starting a hot war in the region that could help fortify his position domestically.

At the end of the day, President Putin has some very serious domestic issues to consider after intervening in Ukraine. But these issues more than likely will fall to the wayside if he succeeds in defending ethnic Russians in Crimea. With India backing Russia's "legitimate interests" claim in Ukraine one thing becomes clear. President Obama's Right Wing critics in the United States have no clue about the region, and their petty and divisive comments show it.

So, yeah, there's a reason why President Obama shouldn't trust the Far Right when it comes to foreign policy (which I wrote about here and here). Their comments are divisive and insincere.

They always have been.

- Mark 

VLADIMIR PUTIN'S REAL LONG GAME ... YES, IT HINGES ON AMERICAN DECLINE

I want to start the new year off by pointing to a must read article that captures the new world order (disorder?) we are seeing unfold before our eyes. It's from Politico Magazine, and is titled, "Putin's Real Long Game."

THE SETTING
In a few words the article by Molly K. McKew argues the world we know is over, and Russia is moving quickly to manipulate trends to their advantage.

The big question is whether President-elect Donald Trump can figure out how the new world is evolving in time to maintain America's global position. Things don't look good.

Since the article is a relatively long read (for many) I'll synopsize the broader argument below.

* THE CRUMBLING WEST: The post-WWII world order, built around Western democratic ideals, global institutions, and free markets (called "liberal internationalism"), is crumbling.

* RUSSIAN LONG-TERM STRATEGY: Russia is doing all it can to undermine what remains of U.S.-led ideals and global institutions, and has been preparing for what's transpiring today since Vladimir Putin's arrival on the global stage.

* TRUMP'S CONFUSION: There's no real confidence that Donald Trump cares about these global trends, or that he really understands Putin's larger global play.

The real issue is that Russia has already abandoned the post-WWII liberal order created by the West. They may have benefited from it's stability when the Soviet Union collapsed, but the Russians feel no special tug to maintain the system today. This is especially the case if it means they must continue playing second fiddle to the United States and Western Europe.

This shouldn't be a surprise. It's the essence of power politics, a game world leaders have modified but haven't abandoned over the millenniums.

This explains, in part, why Russia has worked to undermine NATO, and is opposed to virtually all western-led trade treaties. They only maintain the status quo, which is not good for Russia.

Worse, Western-led institutions are collaborative and nominally transparent. Authoritarian states like Russia don't work well in these kind of environments.

WHAT'S DRIVING RUSSIA
The fact that Russia neither wields influence nor controls these international institutions only makes them a nuisance in the eyes of the Kremlin. Additionally, institutions like NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization aren't viewed as stabilizing institutions. They are tools of an oppressive system led by arrogant men who have it out for Russia.

Russia is engaged in a war, where strategic goals can only be met by pursuing political outcomes favorable to Moscow. If that means bombing Syria and creating refugee flows that destabilize European unity that's OK. If hacking an election and installing an illiberal, populist-nationalist regime  in America helps achieve Russian goals then this is what needs to be done.

Politically, Russia is an anti-democratic state. Putin's long tenure, the fact that Putin had members of Pussy Riot, a largely unknown punk band, imprisoned for criticizing him, while numerous journalists have been killed in Russia, is testament to Russia's undemocratic nature. From a market perspective, it's no secret that Russia is largely managed by insular oligarchs who have no problem operating in an environment of crony capitalism (so does Wall Street's biggest financial institutions, but that's another story for another day).

Put more simply, the Russian state is led by a gang of bikers who have no problem flaunting the law. But they also understand how the appearance of rules are necessary for them to keep order and make money off of the ignorant hoards who still believe democracy matters.

Why does this all matter? Because Vladimir Putin understands all of this. Putin is a smart man. He knows what he's doing. He's in this for the long haul. And he clearly understands the geopolitical stage, and how the game is played. He is a chess player on the world's global chessboard. And Donald Trump? Not so much.

RUSSIA'S STRATEGY
To achieve their ends Russian propaganda efforts have been consistent in their line that the post-WWII system built by the West is in decline. Specifically, Europe is in collapse mode. Brexit proved this. So did the 2008 market collapse.

Donald Trump's election, combined with tens of millions Americans having no interest in getting to the bottom of Russia's efforts to interfere with our 2016 elections, illustrate how transparency and democracy don't really matter in America. The fact that tens of millions of Americans don't care about Russian tampering is proof of American decline.

So Russia smiles as the strength of the West - confidence in the values of both our people and our political institutions - is battered by jubilant victors in the United States, who don't seem to care that winning domestic political battles with the help of Moscow moves America one step closer to losing the larger geo-strategic war.

Specifically ...

They don't seem to understand that chaos in Syria and the Middle East, plus streams of refugees into Europe, helps destabilize both the European Union and Western alliances by putting pressure on democratic institutions and relationships throughout the continent.

They don't care, or don't seem to understand, that Russian interventions in Chechnya, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Crimea (among others) are really part of a smoke & mirrors campaign designed to undermine NATO and rebuild the Russian empire.

They don't care that Donald Trump's financial interests have him involved with Russian oligarchs which, as I've pointed out elsewhere, compromises America's long-term strategic interests.

Fractured Western alliances ... an aggressive strongman-strategist with nuclear weapons rattling Europe's front door ... and an American president who's more interested in his own wealth than the future of a nation ... All of this contributes to the sense that the West is in chaos, if not outright decline.

Growing domestic divisions and doubts about internal institutions, coupled with crumbling alliances, doesn't paint a pretty picture for the future.

And it certainly doesn't help that Russia's figured out the purpose of war today is not just the physical destruction of a nation-state with an invading army. It also includes the slow erosion of a nation's confidence, unity, and sense of shared values.

On this score, Vladimir Putin is playing a good part of the American electorate, and the European continent, like a drum.

There's more to this story, which you can access by clicking here.

- Mark

Hat tip to Agulia for the link to the article.

UKRAINE ... YET ANOTHER REMINDER THAT THE U.S. IS AN EMPIRE IN DECLINE

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Igor Sechin, one of  Putin's long-term allies and a sanction target.

As a result of their refusal to go along with U.S. demands in Crimea the Obama administration has imposed new sanctions on Russia. Well, sort of.

The U.S. is going to impose a visa ban and an asset freeze on seven Russian officials, while sanctioning 17 Russian companies. The European Union is expected to follow suit, but will restrict sanctions to individuals rather than companies.

Under the new measures the U.S. will deny the export or re-export of defense related technologies or services to Russia or Crimea that contribute to Russia's defense or military capabilities.

Here's the problem with the sanctions. Absent the removal of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has squashed the opposition and neutered the independent media, the sanctions will only serve to heighten tensions between the U.S. and Russia in the immediate term. Put another way, expect military events in Ukraine and Crimea to continue apace.

What we need to keep in mind is that Russia has legitimate historical and national security claims in the region, and will continue to embrace and push them.

Over the long-term we can expect Russia and China (as well as anxious rogue states) to continue looking for an alternative to the U.S. dollar as the world's anchor currency.

There's more, but the new reality is that the era of U.S. global primacy is now officially over. We are now - as the British were in 19th century - firmly perched as the world's "swing" state. We misallocated resources and embarrassed ourselves in Iraq, and are bogged down in Afghanistan. Our performance in both places, and our paranoid responses at home, are hardly examples of enlightened leadership.

Sure, Osama Bin Laden is dead. But at what price?

Without a shift in how the U.S. Congress conducts business, or a reversal in the forces that are creating America's growing National Security State domestically, those who think the 21st century can be another American Century are delusional.

- Mark 

RUSSIA'S OLIGARCHS, AMERICA'S OLIGARCHS ... WHAT A "PRESIDENT TRUMP" WORLD MIGHT LOOK LIKE

Last week conservative George Will pointed out that Donald Trump won't release his tax returns, and then speculated that he's not sharing his tax returns because they might show that he's "deeply involved" with Russian oligarchs, the small group of billionaires who help Vladimir Putin manage post-Soviet Russia (oligarchy = rule by a few; oligarch = a member of the oligarchy).

While doing business with Russian oligarchs is not new, it does raise serious questions if you're the presidential candidate for the White House. Let's try and understand what the Russian oligarchs are all about, and then circle back to Trump.

OLIGARCH'S DO WHAT THEY DO
At the outset we want to understand the Russian oligarchs, just like America's early oligarchs, are rich industrialists who took advantage of a system where the rules had not caught up with the business environment. After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was an opening for well connected and quick thinking Russians who understood there was a Wild West market window opening up, which they elbowed their way through.

In many ways, the Russian oligarchs did what America's did in the 19th century; they went after anyone and anything that got in their way, used the political system to game their position, and got rich in the process.

This story is not new, and even helps explain the evolution of democracy in America. After America's oligarchs took advantage of their situation - creating financial empires that dwarfed those of Europe's monarchs - and ran roughshod over America's political process, a populist movement rose up to challenge America's new oligarchic class. This was accompanied by the rise and political conversion of Teddy Roosevelt, who challenged the interests of America's new elites at the beginning of the 20th century.

While this process helped make democracy, and markets, work for more Americans it still wasn't enough. The oligarchs continued to get rich(er) in America.

The rise of Wall Street and new industries after WWI made it difficult for Washington to catch up with market players. This, in part, is what allowed them to game the system in ways that led to the market collapse of 1929 and the Great Depression. It took Franklin D. Roosevelt and a second world war to challenge America's dominant elites and to change the rules of the game.

To be sure, FDR ran into many obstacles, including an attempt to overthrow his government by several of America's financial mandarins. The key point here is recognizing that oligarchs - whether they're from the U.S. or Russia - will do what they can to influence politics and game the system. This is especially the case today as we look at the current crop of global oligarchs, which include American elites as well.

This is what makes claims that Donald Trump is in bed (or wants to be in bed) with the Russian oligarchs such a problem. Here I want to make it clear that my concern isn't necessarily that Russia's new elite class want to enhance or protect their interests. This is what oligarchs do. Dogs bark. Birds fly. Snakes slither. The Founding Fathers understood this, and wrote about the need for the state to mediate and counter balance "those with property" if democracy was going to work (see especially the Federalist Papers on this).

What should worry every American is that Donald Trump may either already owe, or is looking to secure, money that he can no longer get elsewhere. We need to remind ourselves that banks and the largest financial institutions in the U.S. don't want to do business with Donald Trump. There's a reason why. And, yes, his 4 bankruptcies and his long history of stiffing contractors don't help his cause.

What this tells us is that the issue isn't the oligarchs, and the demands they will make. We understand their game. The issue is Donald Trump.

THE TRUMP FACTOR
My concern is Donald Trump has demonstrated little understanding that "business is business" is a fine way to live; but it only applies if you're the only one exposed to the negotiated terms. It's an entirely different ballgame when you're capable of putting the United States of America at risk because you don't want to upset your financial backers in another country - in this case Russia.

This is why Donald Trump's much bragged about Florida real estate deal with a Russian oligarch, and his many attempts at trying to gain access into Moscow's real estate and hotel market are so important. He's desperate to break into the Russian game but his ignorance of their business culture, combined with his temperament and personality, don't necessarily fit into the Russian business style. All indicators suggest that he's been locked out so far. And if Trump has secured business it would most likely be high interest loans with Russian oligarchs, as George Will suggested.

The key here is understanding that Trump's golden ticket into the world of the oligarchs in Russia appears to be Vladimir Putin. Imagine a "President Trump" winning Putin over with, say, shifting the U.S. position on the Crimea - where we're officially opposed to Russia's intervention in the region - so that we support Russia's presence there. That's got to be worth a wink and a nod from Putin for Trump's business interests, wouldn't you agree?

Look, at the end of the day I'm not saying Trump's position vis-a-vis Russia in the Crimea is a bad one. I happen to believe that Russia has legitimate historical and strategic interests (which you can read about here and here), though I am pretty sure Trump doesn't understand these interests. What I'm concerned about is how Trump has no problem mixing his very toxic business interests in with larger U.S. foreign policy interests.

This is a serious issue. It's also what makes Trump so dangerous.

We need to remind ourselves that Trump is about Trump, and no one else. His long and well publicized personal and business history make this clear.

WHAT A "PRESIDENT TRUMP" WORLD MIGHT LOOK LIKE
If Trump becomes president the Russians will effectively gain influence without having to do all the hard work of creating and molding a super spy to infiltrate the American political system. Vladimir Putin will play him like a drum. This is what makes Donald Trump an ideal Manchurian candidate - i.e. a Russian agent/tool - of the first order. Putin gets America's acquiescence, in effect, for the promise of a few loans from the oligarchs and some real estate developments in Moscow.

Europe, on the other hand, sees the collapse of NATO's security umbrella and an emboldened Russia.

For their part, China, realizing they can probably have the South China Sea for a song, becomes more aggressive, and figures out a strategy that promises to let the Trump organization in on their resource or petroleum interests in the region. America's SEATO promises, not surprisingly, vanish with the wind (unless South East Asian partners "pay up", of course).

In effect, everyone in the global community is on their own, just like in the good old days.

With America's security treaties abandoned or compromised in Europe and Asia, what could possibly go wrong?

At the end of the day, we need to remember that U.S. oligarchs became part of an empire they helped push around the world. It's what oligarchs do. One would assume that Russia's oligarchs - and Vladimir Putin - understand how all of this works. In fact, bet on it.

Does anyone seriously believe if the Russians want to buy access and enhance their global influence under a "President Trump" that Trump would be one step ahead of them and capable of saying no?

If you do I have a bridge to sell you, in Iraq. Cheap too.

- Mark

UKRAINE: HOW WE GOT HERE, HOW WE BEGIN THE RESET

My latest article published in the Bakersfield Californian yesterday ...

Almost 60 years ago President John F. Kennedy was faced with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Alarmed over the Soviet Union’s placement of nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba, Kennedy imposed a naval blockade around Cuba which ended a crisis many believed would start World War III, or a nuclear exchange.

The Cuban Missile Crisis is instructive today because the U.S. is currently trying to force Russia out of strategically significant Ukraine. While the political players have changed – communist Russians replaced by a kleptocratic dictator – Russia’s objectives are again tied to broader geostrategic concerns. Unfortunately for Russia’s Vladimir Putin, the threats he sees are the product of a dictator’s delusional fantasies.

There’s no Cold War. Ukraine, unlike Cuba in 1962, wants nothing to do with Russian security obsessions. Perhaps more importantly, Vladimir Putin and his billionaire oligarchs have gotten fabulously rich playing in an international community made stable by a remarkably durable post-war world order created by a complex set of U.S.-led political, military, and economic alliances.

Put another way, Putin’s acting like a paranoid strongman from another era, complete with sycophantic oligarchs too self-serving to discourage his geostrategic delusions. The oligarchs inability to reign in Putin is a product of crushing tyranny at home and incremental developments around the globe which has Putin believing he’s smarter than he is.

Among these developments include how Putin’s aggressive political gambles in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and eastern Ukraine (2014) paid off. In each of these instances Putin understood Western allies wouldn’t have the stomach to back up U.S. threats because of how both Presidents Bush and Obama bungled America’s post-9/11 responses in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bush’s war of aggression and Obama’s nation-building failed so miserably their blustering threats over Putin’s land grabs were effectively ignored.

Simply put, America had a credibility gap.

Putin’s also been buoyed by the ascent of the dictators. Kim Jung Un, Xi Jinping, Jair Bolsonaro and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (among others) have created a sense around the world that democracy’s in trouble. Putin, in turn, believes democracies are too weak to respond to “muscular” policies from the world’s wannabe biker guys.

Perhaps the most disturbing development is what Robert Mueller characterized as Putin’s successful “interference” in America’s 2016 elections. What Putin got in return paid off in spades.

Because Putin’s position is strengthened every time Western alliances are weakened, his global hand was enhanced when Donald Trump applauded Brexit, undermined NATO unity by contemplating leaving the alliance after complaining about “deadbeats” (an untrue characterization), sabotaged the Trans-Pacific Partnership and pulled America out of the Iranian nuclear deal. But Putin really profited when Trump turned Ukrainian policy over to Rudy Giuliani and crafted pro-Russian policies his own national security advisors, Fiona Hill and John Bolton, have made clear undermined America’s security interests.

These geostrategic developments enhanced Russia’s position globally (while diminishing America’s). Putin’s meddling in American politics really paid off when his political avatar, Donald Trump, tried to extort Ukraine’s President Zelensky for already agreed upon weapons by asking for a personal “favor” – an investigation into Joe Biden’s son. For his troubles Trump would secure his first impeachment.

Trump’s national security advisor for Europe and Russia, Fiona Hill, saw through all of this and pointed out trying to extort President Zelensky –as Trump pursued Russian-friendly policies, while lavishly praising Putin – effectively told Russia “Ukraine was [their] playground.”

Putin understood how these developments were augmented by America’s growing political divide domestically, which was inflamed by the attempted overthrow of America’s democracy on January 6^th. Specifically, Putin learned millions of Americans have absolutely no problem abandoning America’s constitutional principles.

America’s growing political divide combined with the GOP’s cult of personality obsession reinforces Putin’s hand on many levels. A divided America – which the “Big Lie” and Trump’s praise for Putin’s Ukrainian invasion contribute to – ensures America’s Ukrainian response will be relatively muted.

This is unfortunate because as Fiona Hill points out, “The polarization of American society has become a national security threat, acting as a barrier to collective action” against legitimate external threats.

The world is now confronted with a genuine crisis in Ukraine that could spin out of control quickly. With Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq in America’s shadow, blustering macho buffoonery can no longer carry the moment with our allies. Reckless wars from our past, coupled with a divided America gripped in a toxic cult of personality environment, have created a precarious moment in our time.  

Incredibly, while past failed military engagements and the coup attempt inspired by the “Big Lie” have stained American prestige, know the world is once again looking to the U.S. for leadership. This is a good thing.

With sanctions applying pressure, air space cut off and Russian oligarchs seeing their assets seized around the world, Putin cannot be pleased knowing Ukrainians are preparing for a drawn-out urban warfare scenario – just as supplies begin arriving from Europe. Let’s remember the 13 days in October 1962 ended precisely because alliances, informed negotiations, and diplomatic entreaties – not always on the front pages – worked.

Expect these dynamics, along with the institutional relationships being rebuilt by Western leaders, to have a similar impact. Bet on it.

Mark A. Martinez, Ph.D., is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at CSU Bakersfield. 

- Mark

READING FOR THE WEEK (March 17, 2014)

Paul Ryan's Irish Amnesia (NY Times).

This is hilarious ... President Obama does "Between Two Ferns" with Zach Galifianakis (Upworthy).

Unprecedented interruption of Supreme Court proceedings (Nation of Change)

Hollywood originally founded to escape Thomas Edison and avoid his patents? This and other weird facts about individual states in America ... (Huffington Post).

Small (major?) victory for President Obama ... House Republicans to introduce 3 bills that improve/clarify aspects of Obamacare (PoliticsUSA).

WHEN MARKETS GO WRONG
12-year-olds (and younger) picking tobacco (The Investigative Fund).

Fished out? The world's fish are in danger (Barry Ritholtz).

This is just one of many reasons why private prisons are simply wrong (NY Post / LA Times).

Subsidizing the 1 percent ... Big businesses receive at least 75 percent of state and local development subsidies, which comes to $110 billion in corporate gifts from the state (Good Jobs First).

Yes, free trade agreements have hurt American workers (Economic Policy Institute).

The "carried interest" tax loophole allows big financial players to treat their income as "special" income, and should be eliminated (Robert Reich).


MARKET TALK ... TROUBLE AROUND THE CORNER
New doomsday poll: 99% chance of 2014 market crash (Market Watch).

"In-the-know" insiders are dumping stocks (Market Watch).


BY THE NUMBERS
The Koch brothers spend more than double what the top 10 unions spend on campaigns (The Investigative Fund).

The F-35 has cost the U.S. taxpayer about $11,000 each, or well over $1 trillion (Political).

Apparently these three questions will tell you if your relationship will last (Lifehacker).

At least 7,100 deaths annually (and perhaps as many as 17,000 deaths) are the likely result of 25 states deciding to reject Medicaid expansion under Obamacare (Physicians for a National Health Program).


WHY INCOME-WEALTH GAPS MATTER
Income gap meet longevity gap (NY Times)

Where income is higher, life spans are longer (NY Times).

Slide Show: Two counties, separated by fortune (NY Times).

Billionaires with big ideas are privatizing American science (NY Times).


RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND CRIMEA
This Time profile of Putin's man in Crimea suggests that Sergei Aksyonov just might be Ukraine's worst  nightmare (Time).

How to deal with Ukraine obsessed Russia ... let's punish Putin, the oligarchs and their shopaholic wives (The Telegraph).

25 questions to test how much you know about the Tsars, Russia and it's history (Christian Science Monitor).


MISCELLANEOUS
MSNBC's Mika Brzezinski calls Sarah Palin a 'multi-million dollar moron' (Bizpac Review).

Jon Stewart goes after the Far Right's logic for opposing how food stamps are used (Upworthy).

How to blow off the Religious right-wingers' who claim they are being persecuted (Salon).

Mexico's craziest drug lord - Nazario Moreno, head of the Knights Templar - 'died' twice and used to dress as God (Time).

Rush Limbaugh: The election of America's first black president has "paralyzed" Washington and the Republican Party (PoliticsUSA).

- Mark

MY RUSSIAN FB FRIENDS HAVE RETURNED ... WELCOME BACK, AND За здоровье!

My Russian friends are back.

______________

A few years ago - specifically, during the 2016 election season - the number of hits that I received on my blog started to surge. I went from an average of 10,000 hits a month to a solid 15,000, then 20,000 and even managed to surpass 40,000 hits one month.

A quick check showed that the new audience was driven by clicks from Russia. Whether the clicks were driven by bots (most likely; I'm not that vain) or by the fact that I was writing a good deal about Russia - specifically, I was writing about Russian intrigue in Crimea, the Trump-Putin connection, or the developments surrounding the Russian Oligarchs - was unimportant. I'm not even interested in total clicks for financial reasons because I don't advertise anything (and ignore all requests to post ads).

As a political scientist my interest in the click surge was watching what was happening in real time as we were also learning how sophisticated the Russian social media and cyberwar game had become.

______________________

______________________

In very simple terms, I was impressed with what the Russians had put in place, and how effective their cyber intrusions had become (I was/am also a little disappointed in how clueless our electorate has become, and how spineless the GOP has become when it comes to Trump and Russia, but those are stories for another day).

Then the Russians virtually disappeared about a year and half ago. To be sure, I stopped posting as much as I normally did, but the disappearance was noticeable in my overall number of hits.

Today, I'm not so much writing about Russia's foreign policies (Putin's getting what he wants), the Russian oligarchs (they're happy-ish) or the Trump-Putin connection (Putin's abusing him like a government mule) as I am writing about Trump's political free fall. And, it would appear, my Russian FB friends are back to monitor the collapse.

At least that's my take on their return.

In any event, I say welcome back. And while I'm not happy watching our great nation being torn apart by our compromised bumbling buffoon of a president, and his Republican sycophants, speaking as a political scientist, За здоровье!

- Mark

WHY THE U.S. SHOULD FEAR A FALTERING CHINA ... FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This is why I continue to subscribe to the journal Foreign Affairs. One of the better articles I've read in some time; "The United States Should Fear a Faltering China" ...

_______________

The United States Should Fear a Faltering China

Beijing’s Assertiveness Betrays Its Desperation

By Michael Beckley October 28, 2019

Xi Jinping during the celebrations for the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing, October 2019
Yan Yan Xinhua / eyevine / Redux

The defining geopolitical story of our time is the slow death of U.S. hegemony in favor of a rising China. Harbingers of Beijing’s ascent are everywhere. China’s overseas investments span the globe. The Chinese navy patrols major sea lanes, while the country colonizes the South China Sea in slow motion. And the government cracks down on dissent at home while administering a hefty dose of nationalist propaganda.

Beijing’s newfound assertiveness looks at first glance like the mark of growing power and ambition. But in fact it is nothing of the sort. China’s actions reflect profound unease among the country’s leaders, as they contend with their country’s first sustained economic slowdown in a generation and can discern no end in sight. China’s economic conditions have steadily worsened since the 2008 financial crisis. The country’s growth rate has fallen by half and is likely to plunge further in the years ahead, as debt, foreign protectionism, resource depletion, and rapid aging take their toll. 

China’s economic woes will make it a less competitive rival in the long term but a greater threat to the United States today. When rising powers have suffered such slowdowns in the past, they became more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. China seems to be headed down just such a path. 

RED FLAGS

In March 2007, at the height of a years-long economic boom, then Premier Wen Jiabao gave an uncharacteristically gloomy press conference. China’s growth model, Wen warned, had become “unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.” The warning was prescient: in the years since, China’s official gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate has dropped from 15 percent to six percent—the slowest rate in 30 years. The country’s economy is now experiencing its longest deceleration of the post-Mao era. 

A growth rate of six percent could still be considered spectacular. By way of contrast, consider that the U.S. economy has been stuck at a rate of around two percent. But many economists believe that China’s true rate is roughly half the official figure. Moreover, GDP growth does not necessarily translate into greater wealth. If a country spends billions of dollars on infrastructure projects, its GDP will rise. But if those projects consist of bridges to nowhere, the country’s stock of wealth will remain unchanged or even decline. To accumulate wealth, a country needs to increase its productivity—a measure that has actually dropped in China over the last decade. Practically all of China’s GDP growth has resulted from the government’s pumping capital into the economy. Subtract government stimulus spending, some economists argue, and China’s economy may not be growing at all.

Subtract stimulus spending and China’s economy may not be growing at all. 

The signs of unproductive growth are easy to spot. China has built more than 50 ghost cities—sprawling metropolises of empty offices, apartments, malls, and airports. Nationwide, more than 20 percent of homes are vacant. Excess capacity in major industries tops 30 percent: factories sit idle and goods rot in warehouses. Total losses from all this waste are difficult to calculate, but China’s government estimates that it blew at least $6 trillion on “ineffective investment” between 2009 and 2014 alone. China’s debt has quadrupled in absolute size over the last ten years and currently exceeds 300 percent of its GDP. No major country has ever racked up so much debt so fast in peacetime. 

Worse still, assets that once propelled China’s economic ascent are fast turning into liabilities. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the country enjoyed expanding access to foreign markets and technology. China was nearly self-sufficient in food, water, and energy resources, and it had the greatest demographic dividend in history, with eight working-age adults for every citizen aged 65 or older. Now China is losing access to foreign markets and technology. Water has become scarce, and the country is importing more food and energy than any other nation, having decimated its own natural endowments. Thanks to the one-child policy, China is about to experience the worst aging crisis in history, because it will lose 200 million workers and young consumers and gain 300 million seniors in the course of three decades. Any country that has accumulated debt, lost productivity, or aged at anything close to China’s current clip has lost at least one decade to near-zero economic growth. How will China handle the coming slump? 

Residential homes under construction in northwestern China, May 2011David Gray / Reuters

WE’VE SEEN THIS BEFORE

When fast-growing great powers run out of economic steam, they typically do not mellow out. Rather, they become prickly and aggressive. Rapid growth has fueled their ambitions, raised their citizens’ expectations, and unnerved their rivals. Suddenly, stagnation dashes those ambitions and expectations and gives enemies a chance to pounce. Fearful of unrest, leaders crack down on domestic dissent. They search feverishly for ways to restore steady growth and keep internal opposition and foreign predation at bay. Expansion presents one such opportunity—a chance to seek new sources of wealth, rally the nation around the ruling regime, and ward off rival powers. 

The historical precedents are plentiful. Over the past 150 years, nearly a dozen great powers experienced rapid economic growth followed by long slowdowns. None accepted the new normal quietly. U.S. growth plummeted in the late nineteenth century, and Washington reacted by violently suppressing labor strikes at home while pumping investment and exports into Latin America and East Asia, annexing territory there and building a gigantic navy to protect its far-flung assets. Russia, too, had a late-nineteenth-century slowdown. The tsar responded by consolidating his authority, building the Trans-Siberian Railway, and occupying parts of Korea and Manchuria. Japan and Germany suffered economic crises during the interwar years: both countries turned to authoritarianism and went on rampages to seize resources and smash foreign rivals. France had a postwar boom that fizzled in the 1970s: the French government then tried to reconstitute its economic sphere of influence in Africa, deploying 14,000 troops in its former colonies and embarking on a dozen military interventions there over the next two decades. As recently as 2009, world oil prices collapsed, which led a stagnating Russia to pressure its neighbors to join a regional trade bloc. A few years later, that campaign of coercion spurred Ukraine’s Maidan revolution and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 

When fast-growing great powers run out of economic steam, they become prickly and aggressive.

The question, then, is not whether a struggling rising power will expand abroad but what form that expansion will take. The answer depends in part on the structure of the global economy. How open are foreign markets? How safe are international trade routes? If circumstances allow it, a slowing great power might be able to rejuvenate its economy through peaceful trade and investment, as Japan tried to do after its postwar economic miracle came to an end in the 1970s. If that path is closed, however, then the country in question may have to push its way into foreign markets or secure critical resources by force—as Japan did in the 1930s. The global economy is more open today than in previous eras, but a global rise in protectionism and the trade war with the United States increasingly threaten China’s access to foreign markets and resources. China’s leaders fear, with good reason, that the era of hyperglobalization that enabled their country’s rise is over. 

The structure of a country’s home economy will further shape its response to a slowdown. The Chinese government owns many of the country’s major firms, and those firms substantially influence the state. For this reason, the government will go to great lengths to shield companies from foreign competition and help them conquer overseas markets when profits dry up at home. A state-led economy like China’s is unlikely to liberalize during a slowdown. Doing so would require eliminating subsidies and protections for state-favored firms, reforms that risk instigating a surge in bankruptcies, unemployment, and popular resentment. Liberalization also could disrupt the crony capitalist networks that the regime depends on for survival. Instead, regimes like China’s usually resort to mercantilist expansion, using money and muscle to carve out exclusive economic zones abroad and divert popular anger toward foreign enemies. The most aggressive expanders of all tend to be authoritarian capitalist states, of which China is clearly a prime example.

TROUBLE AHEAD

China’s recent behavior is a textbook response to economic insecurity. Back in the 1990s and the early years of this century, when the country’s economy was booming, China loosened political controls and announced to the world its “peaceful rise,” to be pursued through economic integration and friendly diplomatic relations. Compare the situation today: labor protests are on the rise, elites have been moving their money and children out of the country en masse, and the government has outlawed the reporting of negative economic news. President Xi Jinping has given multiple internal speeches warning party members of the potential for a Soviet-style collapse. The government has doubled internal security spending over the past decade, creating the most advanced propaganda, censorship, and surveillance systems in history. It has detained one million Uighurs in internment camps and concentrated power in the hands of a dictator for life. State propaganda blames setbacks, such as the 2015 stock market collapse and the 2019 Hong Kong protests, on Western meddling. These are not the actions of a confident superpower. 

China has projected its power abroad throughout this turbulent period—tripling foreign direct investment and quintupling overseas lending in an ambitious attempt to secure markets and resources for Chinese firms. Beijing also has gone out militarily, launching more warships over the past decade than the whole British navy holds and flooded major sea lanes in Asia with hundreds of government vessels and aircraft. It has built military outposts across the South China Sea and frequently resorts to sanctions, ship-ramming, and aerial intercepts in territorial disputes with its neighbors.

If China’s growth slows further in the coming years, as is likely, the Chinese government will probably double down on the repression and aggression of the past decade. When the country’s leaders cannot rely on rapid growth to bolster their domestic legitimacy and international clout, they will be all the more eager to squelch dissent, burnish their nationalist credentials, and boost the economy by any means necessary. Moreover, powerful interest groups—most notably, state-owned enterprises and the military and security services—have developed a vested interest in maintaining China’s current strategy, which funnels money into their coffers. As a result, the government would struggle to extricate itself from foreign entanglements even if it wanted to. 

WASHINGTON’S BALANCING ACT

The danger to the United States and its allies is clear. Rampant espionage, protectionism, a splintered Internet, naval clashes in the East and South China Seas, and a war over Taiwan are only the more obvious risks that a desperate and flailing China will pose. U.S. statecraft will need to contain these risks without causing China to lash out in the process. To that end, Washington will have to deter Chinese aggression, assuage China’s insecurities, and insulate the United States from blowback should deterrence and reassurance fail. The inherent tension among these objectives will make the task a very difficult one. 

Chinese power will gradually mellow. Now, however, is a moment of maximum danger.

Some initiatives could help strike the proper balance. Instead of deterring Chinese expansionism by sailing provocative but vulnerable naval armadas past China’s coastline, for instance, Washington could deploy mobile antiship and surface-to-air missile launchers on allied shores. If the United States joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—and invited China to join, too—Beijing would have the motive and means to reduce its trade-distorting practices without fighting a 1930s-style trade war. China might spurn the offer, but then the treaty would at least strengthen the commitment of its signatories to the free flow of goods, money, and data. In so doing, it would limit the spread of China’s mercantilist and digital authoritarian policies. The United States could supplement this stance by investing more in scientific research and investigations into specific Chinese companies and investors, so that it can maintain technological superiority without banning Chinese investment and immigration into the United States. These moves would not eliminate the root causes of U.S.-Chinese rivalry, but they would protect U.S. interests while avoiding a slide into a cold or hot war. 

Perhaps in a few decades, Chinese power will gradually mellow. Now, however, is a moment of maximum danger, because China is too weak to feel secure or satisfied with its place in the world order but strong enough to destroy it. As China’s economic miracle comes to an end, and Xi’s much-touted Chinese Dream slips away, the United States must contain China’s outbursts with a careful blend of deterrence, reassurance, and damage limitation. Compared to gearing up for a whole-of-society throwdown against a rising superpower, this mission may seem uninspiring. But it would be smarter—and ultimately more effective. 

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- Mark